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Code-Share Agreements: A Developing
Trend in U.S. Bilateral Aviation
Negotiations
ROBERT F. BARRON II*

INTRODUCTION
Consumers who intend to travel internationally in 1996 and who will originate
their journey from interior U.S. cities may be surprised to discover that they are

flying on an airline other than the one they thought they booked. Indeed, in
accordance with current government regulation of the airline industry, literally
thousands of consumers each day find themselves flying on a carrier different
from the one indicated on their airline tickets. This is not an aberration-no last

minute flight cancellations; no flight protections on another carrier made in the
best interest of the consumer. To the contrary, this is a phenomenon which is

largely in the commercial interest of the airlines, and is not only condoned by the
United States Department of Transportation ("DOT"),' but is quickly becoming
a prevalent topic of discussion in both bilateral negotiations between the United
States and foreign countries, and in commercial agreements between U.S. and

foreign airlines.
The current state of affairs in the airline industry helps provide some insight
into DOT's policies. "Worldwide, airlines have experienced a $15 billion
shortfall over the last four years." 2 Reports indicate that "from January 1978

through December 1993, cumulative net losses for the major U.S. airlines [alone
have] totaled $9.3 billion. 3 Consequently, in an industry where the term
"survival of the fittest" is now a reality, airlines around the world have begun a
race to form global alliances, hoping to find partners with the right synergies to

* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.B.A., 1990,
University of Missouri-St. Louis; B.A., 1979, Indiana University. I would like to thank
Professor Don Gjerdingen for his helpful comments in planning this Note. I would also like to
thank my parents for a lifetime of inspiration and my three children for bringing a smile to my
face at the most challenging of times. Most importantly, I thank my wife, Diane, for her love
and immeasurable support throughout the project.
1. The United States Department of Transportation ("DOT') is the administrative agency
which oversees "formal aviation-related functions includ[ing] the following: negotiation of
international air transportation rights [and] selection of American air carriers to serve
international markets in which capacity is limited by treaty." Thomas D. Grant, Foreign
Takeovers of UnitedStates Airlines: Free Trade Process,Problems,and Progress,31 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 63, 69 (1993); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(e), 40105 (1994) (outlining policies
and procedures the Secretary of Transportation must consider in conducting international
aviation negotiations and agreements).
2. Paul S. Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategiesfor Survival, 23 TRANsP. L.J. 15,
18 (1995).
3. Id at 18 (citing Julius Maldutis, Industry Investment Requirements-Looking Beyond
2000, Address at the 7th International Air Transportation Association High-Level Aviation
Symposium (Sept. 6-7, 1993)).
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generate profits, and fearful that if they "miss the boat" they will face a certain
demise.
When United Airlines purchased "Pan Am's Pacific Division [in 1991,] no
non-U.S. airline owned a piece of any large U.S. airline.... Today, British
Airways owns 24% of USAir, KLM owns 20% of Northwest Airlines, Air
Canada owns 24% of Continental and Swissair and Singapore Airlines each owns
5% of Delta."4 Since U.S. carriers have been struggling financially, they have
welcomed the injection of cash from the mergers, while foreign carriers have
viewed financial ownership of U.S. carriers as one strategy that will ensure that
they will have a U.S. partner capable of providing feeder traffic from "off-line"
cities-those which they cannot serve profitably, or are not permitted to serve in
their own right under U.S. law. Yet most foreign carriers are unwilling or unable
to invest in U.S. carriers which are literally ill-equipped with aging fleets, carry
perilously high debt loads, and possess a history of financial losses. Furthermore,
U.S. law governing acquisition of U.S. carriers by foreign companies continues
to be restrictive, which prohibits further investment.5 Hence, foreign airlines
have rightly concluded that code-share agreements offer them a low cost, but
highly effective alternative means of getting their "foot in the door" of the U.S.
domestic market.
This Note is organized in four parts. Part I provides an introduction to the
manner in which governments grant authority to airlines enabling them to fly
between cities. It will also demofistrate the importance of such rights in bilateral
negotiations. Part II examines the development of airline computer reservation
systems ("CRSs") and discusses the impact they have on the consumer's
selection of which airline to fly. Part III takes a critical look at code-shares, and
examines the wisdom of DOT's increasing use of code-share rights in bilateral
negotiations, and the resulting effect they have on the traveling consumer. Part
IV integrates code-share agreements, bilateral negotiations, and CRSs, and
demonstrates that code-shares provide only marginal benefits for consumers. Part
IV concludes that DOT's growing use of code-shares is nothing more than a
means of avoiding taking the final step into a true "open skies" policy,7 which

4. J.A. Donoghue, The Players:Impact of Mergers in US Airline Industry, AIR TRANSP.
WORLD, Dec. 1, 1995, at 7.
5. Even though DOT relaxed the limit on total equity that a foreign carrier can hold in
allowing KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to effectively purchase 49% of Northwest Airlines, this
controlling statute still restricts foreign ownership to a maximum of 25% of the U.S. airline's
voting equity stock. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15)(C) (1994) (defining a corporation as a citizen
if 75% of its voting interest is controlled by individual U.S. citizens); Seth M. Warner,
Comment, Liberalize Open Skies: Foreign Investment and Cabotage Restrictions Keep
Noncitizens in Second Class, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 309 nn.231-32 (1993) (discussing earlier
version of the statute).
6. In general, "[c]odesharing is the practice by which [two or more] airlines connect flight
legs into a longer route under one computer designator code and charge a single fare for the
combined flights." Warner, supranote 5, at 281 n.29.
7. Order Requesting Comments, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (1992). This initiative was
introduced in 1992 by former Secretary of Transportation, Andrew H. Card, Jr., announcing
that the United States was willing to negotiate open skies agreements with European countries
which would grant U.S. air carriers free access to their markets on a reciprocal basis.
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it does at the public's expense. Finally, this Note concludes that federal
guidelines on disclosure of code-share agreements are inadequate, and suggests
that DOT discontinue its use of code-shares as a substitute for a true open skies
policy.
I. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC RIGHTS
The legal framework for international aviation was first established at the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919, which produced the Convention for the Regulation
of Aerial Navigation.8 The Paris Convention "established the principle that every
nation has 'complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory."' 9 In 1944, in response to numerous political, economic, and technical
problems which developed as international air travel grew, the United States
sponsored the Chicago International Aviation Convention" ° at which it proposed
that all airlines have virtually unrestricted traffic rights on international routes.
The U.S. negotiators called for multilateral recognition of five "freedoms of the
air."
The five freedoms are universally applicable working rules for bilateral air
transportation relations [today]. They are:
1) A civil aircraft has the right to fly over the territory of another country
without landing, provided the overflown country is notified in advance and
approval is given.
2) A civil aircraft of one country has the right to land in another country
for technical reasons, such as refueling or maintenance, without offering any
commercial service to or from that point.
3) An airline has the right to carry traffic from its country of registry to
another country.
4) An airline has the right to carry traffic from another country to its own
country of registry.
5) An airline has the right to carry traffic between two countries outside
its own country of registry as long as the flight originates or terminates in its
own country of registry."
The United States also insisted that the determination of capacities, frequencies,
and fares could be appropriately dictated by market forces.
Great Britain opposed the Americans' proposal and instead urged "the creation
of an 'International Air Authority' to coordinate air transport, apportion the

8. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, art. 1, 11
L.N.T.S. 173, 190 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
9. Warner, supra note 5, at 279 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 8, 11 L.N.T.S. at
190).
10. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 296 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
11. Paul S. Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies": The Deregulationof International
Air Transport,15 TRANsP. L.J. 305,312 n.13 (1987).
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world's air routes, and make decisions on frequencies and tariffs in accordance
with agreed criteria designed to 'avoid wasteful competition."12
Ultimately the participants rejected both of these proposals. Although a
majority of the nations attending the Chicago Conference later adopted the first
two freedoms, there was an insurmountable disagreement regarding the degree
to which capacity under fifth freedom rights should be regulated. Many European
nations feared that a system which granted multilateral fifth freedom rights
without adequate controls on capacity or frequency would confer on U.S. carriers
"unlimited access to the European carriers' most valuable traffic."' 3 Similarly,
they were unwilling to allow an international regulatory body to formulate and
dictate international air transport at the expense of their sovereignty, and
consequently rejected the British proposal.' 4
Even though attending nations at the Chicago Conference failed to reach an
agreement on a multilateral exchange of traffic rights, they succeeded in
establishing the International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"). 5 They
formed ICAO initially in order to develop uniform technical standards relating
to international airlines. Subsequently, participating nations have expanded
ICAO's jurisdiction to include international operatingstandards, airworthiness
certification, registration of aircraft, and "[t]oday ICAO is one of the largest and
agencies in the United Nations family, with 156
most successful specialized
16
member nations."'
Another result of the Chicago Convention was that participants reinforced the
legal principle first developed at the Paris Convention-that each state maintains
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. Given this fact and
because they did not reach a multilateral solution, a nation that wanted its
carrier(s) to operate international services would be required to enter into direct,
bilateral negotiations with foreign governments to negotiate the parameters of
international airline operations between the two countries. 7 The language in
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention set the stage for bilateral negotiations by
stating that "[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into
the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other

12. Bruce Stockfish, OpeningClosed Skies: The Prospectsfor FurtherLiberalizationof
Trade in InternationalAir Transport Services, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 599, 604 (1992) (citing
ANDREAs F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-8 (1981)).
13. Dempsey, supra note 11, at 312 n.9.
14. Id. at 313.
15. Article 44 of the Chicago Convention states that:
The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the principles and
techniques of air navigation and to foster the planning and development of
international air transport so as to...
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and
economical transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste by unreasonable competition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every
contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines.
Chicago Convention, supra note 10, 61 Stat. at 1192-93, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326.
16. Dempsey, supranote 11, at 313.
17. Id. at 314.
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authorization of that State." 8 Accordingly, the Chicago Convention set the
framework for the exchange of bilateral air traffic rights which began shortly
thereafter, and continues to this day.
To illustrate a simplistic bilateral agreement, consider the factors involved in
the development of a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Australia which
occurred in 1988.9 Both countries had long designated a single, governmentowned international airline, and both owned and operated Boeing 747 aircraft.
Aerolineas Argentinas believed that a market existed which would initially
support a weekly service between the two countries, and which could later be
expanded once the market was further developed. It also aspired to use Australia
as a stepping-stone into the lucrative Asian market. On the other side, Qantas
viewed the route as the only gap in its worldwide route structure. It already
operated extensive services into Asia, Europe, and North America and although
it recognized South America as a small market at the outset, it saw significant
strategic potential in the long term.
With no bilateral agreement in place, travelers coming from the South Pacific
ordinarily traveled north to Los Angeles or San Francisco, then south to
Argentina. The most direct route at the time from Sydney, Australia to Buenos
Aires, Argentina required a journey of fifty-five hours (elapsed time).2"
Aerolineas Argentinas proposed a new route (one no commercial airline had ever
flown) which traversed the South Pole and reduced the elapsed travel time to
approximately twenty-five hours, which included a technical refueling stop in
southern Argentina.
With no one to oppose the agreement and strong mutual goals, the respective
governments easily reached a bilateral agreement providing for the operation of
one weekly Boeing 747 service for each carrier. The bilateral agreement
designated the precise type of aircraft that could be flown or substituted, the
number of seats allotted, the exclusive names of the carriers that could operate,
and specified that the origin and destination would be the two primary cities,
Sydney and Buenos Aires. It also stipulated that subject to a separate commercial
agreement between the two national carriers, one carrier could choose not to
operate, but could instead negotiate a seat purchase agreement with the operating
carrier. In the subsequent commercial agreement Qantas agreed not to operate in
exchange for the ability to sell, as its own, an allocation of fifty seats per flight.
In exchange, Aerolineas Argentinas received the right to exercise Qantas's
weekly flight allocation, which it only exercised during the peak travel months
of December to February each year. In the seven years since the bilateral was
signed, Qantas has never operated its own aircraft on the route.

18. Chicago Convention, supranote 10, 61 Stat at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
19. This author participated in developing and implementing a commercial agreement
between Qantas Airways, the airline of Australia, and Aerolineas Argentinas, the designated
international flag carrier of Argentina. The commercial agreement was provided for in the
bilateral agreement between the two countries.
20. Elapsed time includes the total number of hours it takes to fly the originating flight from
Australia to the west coast of the United States, the layover time on the west coast, the time for
the final flight to Argentina, and the time required for intermediate stops, if any.
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Even a relatively simple bilateral agreement such as this contained some of the
complexities that exist in nearly all bilateral agreements. The bilateral agreement
granted "beyond" traffic rights to the designated Australian carrier, permitting
it to carry passengers beyond Argentina to two additional points in South
America, in exchange for the Argentine carrier's right to travel to one point in
New Zealand and one additional point in Australia. However, if for example,
Qantas chose to exercise its right to fly its aircraft to Buenos Aires, then on to
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, it still could not do so without first negotiating a separate
bilateral agreement between Australia and Brazil which granted it that same
right. So while the competitive position of air carriers operating internationally
continues to be determined by terms negotiated under bilateral treaties as
propounded at the Chicago Convention, a government must often negotiate
multilateral agreements to achieve its desired air traffic rights.
In addition to the five freedoms of the air which were postulated at the Chicago
Convention, scholars and negotiators now recognize sixth, seventh, and eighth
freedoms.
The sixth freedom grants the right to carry traffic from the grantor country to
the home country and then carry that same traffic, under a different flight
number to a third country.... The seventh freedom grants the right to carry
traffic from the grantor country to a third country without stopping at the
home country [and] the eighth freedom grants carriage rights now restricted
by cabotage law. 21
Cabotage is a term which is unfamiliar to the traveling public, but which has
an enormous impact on the airlines which operate in and out of the United States.
Although the term originated centuries ago in relation to maritime rights, the
airline industry uses "cabotage" to describe the prohibition of foreign carriers
from carrying domestic traffic, thereby preserving the state's22 sovereignty.
Although under the Paris Convention states could bilaterally grant cabotage
rights to one another, the cabotage provision composed at the Chicago
Convention eliminated a contracting state's right to grant exclusive cabotage
privileges to another state.23 Cab6tage is particularly significant to the United
States because the United States----"by far the world's largest and potentially
most lucrative domestic aviation market under a single sovereignty-restricts
cabotage quite unbendingly; no foreign air carrier may provide domestic air
service in the United States."24 Consider the following hypothetical facts:

21. F. Allen Bliss, Note, Rethinking Restrictions on Cabotage:Moving to Free Trade in
PassengerAviation, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 382, 388 n.25 (1994).
22. "State" as used by the Chicago Convention refers to sovereign nations.
23. Article seven of the Chicago Convention, the cabotage provision, states that:
Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of
other contracting States to take on its territory passengers, mail and cargo carried
for remuneration or hire and destined for another point in its territory. Each
contracting State undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically
grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of
any other State, and not to obtain such exclusive privilege from any other State.
Chicago Convention, supra note 10, 61 Stat. at 1182, 15 U.N.T.S. at 300.
24. Grant, supra note 1, at 75.
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Germany has negotiated a bilateral agreement with the United States whereby
Lufthansa German Airlines has been granted traffic rights to operate from
Frankfurt to New York, Chicago, and Atlanta. Because of the prohibition on
cabotage, Lufthansa cannot compete with U.S. carriers by operating its flights
between New York and Chicago, carrying passengers that are traveling only
between those cities. Unless there is sufficient demand to independently operate
services to each of those cities on some regular basis, Lufthansa may be
interested in flying from Frankfurt to New York where it would discharge
passengers, then continue on to Chicago. But again it would only be allowed to
carry passengers that originated in Frankfurt. In all probability the economics of
operating such a service would be prohibitive. But even if the carrier decided to
operate such a service it would be forced to deny carriage to an American
traveler standing at the gate wishing to purchase a ticket to fly from New York
to Chicago-under cabotage they cannot make exceptions. Because of cabotage
restrictions and the limits on investment in U.S. airlines, code-shares have
become a key factor in global alliance strategies.
II.

COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS

In today's computer age it comes as no surprise that CRSs have played an
integral role in the airline industry. As airlines expanded their route structures
over time, they found it uneconomical and impractical to distribute their product
through their own sales and ticket offices, and third party specialists (travel
agents) emerged to fill that need. Today travel agencies are the principal
distribution channel for airlines and they avail themselves of airline products
through CRSs. "CRSs are massive databases that allow the user, typically a travel
agent, to check flight availability and fare information instantaneously, to make
airline ticket reservations, and to print out tickets and boarding passes for listed
airlines."25 The productivity of an automated travel agency is far greater than that
of its non-computerized counterparts which must phone each individual airline
to check fares and flight availability. Since the late 1980s, "95 percent of all
domestic travel agencies used CRSs and travel agents booked 92 percent of the
domestic airline sales through them."26
A. U.S. Carriers'Dominance of the CRS Industry
Because of intense competition in the airline industry, frequent changes in
pricing and schedules, and the growing dependence on travel agencies for
product distribution, airlines recognized the need to develop CRSs as an efficient
means of placing their products in the hands of their new "sales force"-travel
agencies. "United Airlines and American Airlines, which led the industry in the

25. Note, The Legal andRegulatoryImplicationsofAirline Computer ReservationSystems,

103 HARV. L. REV. 1930, 1931 (1990).
26. Marj P. Learning, Note, EnlightenedRegulation of ComputerizedReservationsSystems
Requires a Conscious Balance Between Consumer Protection and Profitable Airline
Marketing,21 TRANSP. L.J. 469, 472 (1993).
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development of CRS technology, each spent over $100 million to develop their
respective systems. 27 Initially CRSs were leased to travel agents for nominal
fees, and other airlines were permitted to list their flights at no charge. At that
time the vendor airlines were content with the incremental revenues they gained
from their respective CRSs. In fact, the vendor airlines were receiving
"substantial revenue from additional airline business they received through
'biasing' the system" through "displaying flight information in a way that
favor[ed] the vendor airline."28
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the vendor airlines recognized the incomeproducing potential of the CRS and reformulated their strategies. United and
American began signing "cohost contracts" with other airlines wherein the
subscribing airlines were given preferential treatment in the CRS in exchange for
a "booking fee." The fee was paid on every flight segment booked through the
CRS by any airline or travel agent. "Beginning in 1981, vendor airlines began
entering into individually negotiated contracts with each airline, and booking
fees rose from $0.25 per booking up to $3.00 per booking."29
Today there are four CRSs which are wholly or partially owned by U.S.
airlines: (1) SABRE, which is wholly owned by American Airlines and is
installed in approximately 22,000 travel agencies; (2) APOLLO, in which United
Airlines holds a majority ownership position and a myriad of other carriers hold
minority positions, is located in 25,000 agency locations; (3) System One,
originally developed by now defunct Eastern Airlines and later acquired by
Continental Airlines, is installed in roughly 7,500 locations; (4) and Worldspan,
which was a merger of Trans World Airlines' PARS system and Delta's DATAS
II system, is installed in over 10,000 travel agency sites. ° The CRSs have
produced significant revenue for the airlines-in 1991 revenue earned by three
of the CRSs was reported as $655 million for SABRE, $475 million for
APOLLO, and $378 million for System One.3' Income is generated through three
primary channels: installation and leasing fees from travel agency subscribers for
use of terminals and related equipment, segment booking fees paid by
subscribing airlines, and incremental revenue generated by owning the CRS. 2

27. Larry G. Locke, Note, Flying the UnfriendlySkies: The Legal Fallout over the Use of
Computerized ReservationSystems as a Competitive Weapon in the Airline Industry, 2 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 219,220 (1989); see also Notice for Advance Comments, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,171,
41,173 (1983) (discussing the expenditure of money by airlines for development of this
technology).
28. In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443,
1450 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affd sub nom. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d
536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992).
29. Id. This practice continued unabated until 1984 when the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") established new rules requiring CRS vendors to charge subscribing carriers similar
fees for similar services, and to provide unbiased displays. However the new rules did not
regulate booking fees. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 255, .9(b)(1), .10(a) (1996).
30. Learning, supra note 26, at 473-74.
31. Id. at 472-74.
32. Many industry analysts have theorized that there is a "halo effect" by which travel
agents are more apt to book the airline whose system they are using. See, e.g., Note, supra, note
25, at 1932 n. 14. Travel agents are not likely to forget which system they are using as they
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The airlines possess inordinate control over travel agencies' booking practices
thereby impacting consumer preferences, especially United and American
Airlines which have "dominated the CRS market with a combined share of [as
much as] 77 percent of national CRS rentals."33 As vendor airlines with control
over the mainframes, they have access to reports which indicate the percentages
of a travel agency's bookings that were sold on the vendor airline and on
competing airlines. Vendor airlines can use the data as a coercive marketing tool
directly when establishing lease prices and override commissions, or indirectly
by controlling the level of assistance provided to the travel agency, such as by
flexing ticketing deadline rules or clearing a valued agency client from a wait
list.
CRS lease contracts have resulted in substantial litigation. In general, CRS
vendors require travel agents to sign contracts for five years. These contracts
often contain minimum use provisions that require the travel agent to book at
least half of its flights on that specific CRS and typically contain strict liquidated
damages clauses that discourage travel agents from switching to a competing
system before the expiration of the contract. By virtue of aggressive sales tactics
by system vendors, a travel agent wishing to terminate the lease often faces
stipulated damages amounting to several years of lease rentals. For example, in
UnitedAirlinesv. Austin Travel Corp.,34 System One persuaded the Long Island
travel agency to convert from APOLLO to its system, "agree[ing] to defend [the]
travel agents in suits brought by United and to indemnify [them] for any damages
from breaching their lease[].... System One... challenged the United leases as
agreements restraining trade and monopolizing the CRS market in violation of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."3 The court awarded United over $400,000
and "found United innocent of monopolization because Apollo accounted for
only 8% of revenues generated by CRS bookings in the Long Island area."36
Two other theories have also been advanced to show that CRS vendors have
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.37 "The first theory was that defendants'
CRSs are essential facilities for the distribution of air travel and thus should be
controlled by the essential facilities doctrine."3 "The [second] theory was that
defendants had monopolized.., national and local air transportation markets and
the various markets for CRS service." 39 A detailed discussion of antitrust law is
beyond the scope of this Note, but it is essential to recognize that all of the

generally receive training unique to that system. Each system also has a unique
look-APOLLO, for example, is sky blue and easily recognizable.
33. Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, ContractPenalties,Monopolizing Strategies,
andAntitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1993).
34. 867 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1989).
35. Brodley & Ma, supra note 33, at 1189-90.
36. Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservation Systems, Creative Destruction, and Consumer
Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 287,292 (1991).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1994).
38. Locke, supranote 27, at 227 (citing In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys.
Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1451 (C.D. Cal. 1988), affrdsub nom. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992)).
39. Id.
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antitrust challenges were rejected by the courts. In Air Passenger,the court
opined that American Airlines could not have monopolized the market for air
transportation when it had never had more than a fourteen percent share of the
total air transportation market. Similarly, the court stated that given the existence
of competing CRSs in the marketplace which serve as substitutes, American's
ability to weaken competition in the air transportation market is constrained.4"
In sum, CRSs have given proprietary airlines significant profits, but perhaps
more importantly, enormous and unfettered control over travel agencies and,
therefore, consumer choice. The significance of CRSs as they relate to codeshare agreements will be discussed further in Part IV of this Note.
III.

THE EMERGENCE OF CODE-SHARE AGREEMENTS IN
COMMERCIAL AVIATION

Code-sharing arrangements have existed in the U.S. domestic airline industry
since the 1960s. Because of the excessiVe cost of operating jet aircraft on routes
with limited travel, Allegheny Airlines (later renamed USAir) first formed
agreements with commuter carriers4 ' to provide service on those feeder routes
under the "AL" (Allegheny's) flight designator code. The strategy enabled
Allegheny to withdraw its own higher cost aircraft and crews yet still connect
passengers to its principal flights. Furthermore, it afforded Allegheny the
opportunity to maintain its presence in many small communities, since the
commuter carriers often painted their aircraft in the colors and with the logo of
the major carrier. The strategy proved successful and it slowly gained popularity
among other major airlines and regional feeder carriers.
"Between 1984 and 1989, the number of U.S. domestic code-sharing
partnerships increased from only a few to fifty-seven., 42 This prompted DOT to
adopt a policy concerning code-shares. DOT officials considered code-share
arrangements negotiated between U.S. carriers "private business deals"' 43 and as
such did not require prior government approval. This also held true for
international code-shares, provided that the foreign airlines had the underlying
route authority."4 However, as the number of code-share arrangements grew,
DOT recognized the potential for deception of the public. Finally in 1985, DOT
promulgated a policy on airline designator code-sharing which states that "the

40. Air Passenger,694 F. Supp. at 1455-56.
41. Commuter carriers usually operated turboprop planes of small capacity (in the range
of 15 to 30 seats) with a high number of frequent flights between cities. These planes were
especially economical to operate on short haul flights of approximately one hour. The pilots
tended to be lower paid, with fewer flight hours than pilots at "major airlines," and the flights
were permitted to operate without flight attendants. See generally Dempsey, supra, note 2, at
38.
42. Carolyn Hadrovic, Airline Globalization:A CanadianPerspective, 19TRANsP. L.J. 193,
196(1990).
43. See Joan M. Feldman, U.S. Inconsistencies Cloud InternationalCode-Sharing,AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Apr. 1988, at 20, 21.

44. Hadrovic, supra note 42, at 197 (citing DOT, OuTLiNE OF CODE-SHARING
DEVELOPMENTS (1988)).
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use of a single air carrier designator code by two or more air carriers [is] in
violation of section 411 of the Act unless... the air carriers give reasonable
and
45
timely notice of the existence of such code-sharing arrangements.,
Since this policy has remained unchanged for over ten years, DOT is
apparently satisfied that this regulation is sufficient to fulfill the Department's
stated purpose which includes "recommend[ing] to the President and the
Congress for approval national transportation policies and programs... with full
and appropriate consideration of the needs of the public .... "46 Yet many
scholars and industry analysts believe that in the domestic market:
Regional and commuter airlines have come under the domination of
megacarriers through 'code-sharing' programs, which represent a nadir in
industry ethics, already at an all time low.... [This prompted] one commuter
[airline] official [to state that] '[t]he only thing worse than a code-sharing
agreement for passengers is no code-sharing agreement for the commuter
airline."'4 7
IV. CODE-SHARE PROVISIONS IN BILATERALS:
QUESTIONING DOT POLICIES

In recent years there has been an explosion in the number of code-share
agreements. In 1995, the Director-General of the International Air Transport
Association proclaimed, "'There are now more than 400 [airline] alliances
worldwide... [and o]ne hundred thirty-three of them involve inter-continental
links and codesharing."' 4 Proponents claim that consumers actually receive
benefits from code-shares. One commentator noted:
Code-shares provid[e] passage under the name of a single airline and through
the ticketing and airfare arrangements of that airline, even though passengers
must switch airlines en route. [He declared that] without code-sharing, a
passenger who needed to switch airlines to go from point A to point C

45. 14 C.F.R. § 399.88 (1996). The policy sets minimum disclosure requirements which
require air carriers to:
(1) Identify, with an asterisk or other means, each flight in which the airline code
is different from the code of the carrier actually providing the service, in written
or electronic schedule information provided by the air carrier to the public, the
Official Airline Guide and.., computer reservations system vendors;
(2) Provide information in any direct oral communication with a consumer
concerning a code-sharing flight sufficient to alert the consumer that the flight
will occur on an airline different from the carrier whose code is used and identify
the carrier(s) actually providing the service; and
(3) Provide frequent, periodic notice in advertising media that can reasonably be
expected to convey to potential passengers and travel agents the existence of a
code-sharing relationship and the identities of the carriers actually providing the
service.
Id.

46. Theodore P. Harris, The Disaster of Deregulation, 20 TRANSp. L.J. 87, 93 (1991)
(citing DOT, DECLARATION OF PURPOSE (1966)) (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. JATA DirectorGeneralPredictsRecord Profitsfor 1995, WORLD AIRLrNENEws, Nov.
13, 1995, available in DIALOG, IAC-NEWS database.
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through point B would require separate ticketing, billing, scheduling, and
baggage check-in.49
Yet these benefits are overstated. Nearly all airlines have multilateral interline
agreements which allow a passenger to purchase a single ticket (with multiple
coupons) from a local travel agent. The ticket will provide for round trip travel
on all flights, and the consumer is billed at one fare which often includes a fare
on a domestic route that is subsidized by an international airline. Additionally,
baggage can be "interlined," that is, checked from the originating U.S. domestic
city to the final, international destination.
A simple hypothetical can illustrate the pros and cons of such a trip with and
without a code-share. Assume the passenger lives in Atlanta, Georgia, and
wishes to travel to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, but there is no code-share. If Delta has
an interline agreement with Varig Brazilian Airlines, passengers can purchase a
single ticket from a local travel agency and check their baggage with Delta at the
Atlanta airport (through to Rio de Janeiro). They will fly to Miami on Delta and
then walk to the Varig counter or gate. They later board a Varig plane for the
flight to Rio. On the other hand, if a code-share is established between the two
airlines, the travel agent may tell them that there are two carriers opei'ating
between Atlanta and Rio: Delta and Varig. The passengers may choose Delta, the
hometown airline. In essence, the trip will be the same except for the confusion
that is inherent in code-shares, that is upon arriving in Miami the passengers may
be confused about where to go for the flight to Rio, or may be completely
unaware that they will be flying on Varig.0
The one significant benefit that consumers would undoubtedly desire from a
code-share is lower airfares, but surprisingly "carriers with code-sharing
arrangements charge [on average] 8% higher fares."'"
A. An Explosion ofCode-Share Agreements Between the
United States and ForeignAirlines
Last year DOT approved a plan that increased a British Airways-USAir "codeshare network from 66 USAir cities ... to 138.... The deal also... extend[ed]

the code share to five new BA [British Airways] gateways: Atlanta, Chicago,
Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston and Seattle." 52 And although American Airlines has
often expressed public opposition to the United States' increasingly code-share
based policy, it has been vigorously signing them since 1988. In November 1995,
American announced that it would be "put[ting] its AA computer reservations
system designator 6n four weekly Qantas flights between Los Angeles and both
Auckland and Melbourne, [providing American with] code-shares on 24 weekly
Qantas flights between Sydney and Los Angeles. Qantas puts its QF code on

49. Grant, supra note 1, at 80 n.48.
50. Passengers may or may not be required to check-in with the international carrier
depending upon the level of efficiency achieved between the two code-sharing airline partners.
51. Dempsey, supra note 2, at 36 (citing PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET.AL., 1 Aviation Law and
Regulation §5.05 (1993)).
52. Bill Poling, U.S.-UK Deal Expands Code Shares, Adds Third Chicago-London
Airline, TRAVEL WEEKLY, June 8, 1995, at 1.
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American flights between Los Angeles and Boston, Chicago, New York Kennedy
[airport] and Washington Dulles [airport]." 53 In other words, when travel agents
look for flight availability in their CRSs, they can offer consumers one of
American Airlines' twenty-four weekly "flights" from the United States to
Australia, even though no American plane ever touches down on the Australian
continent.
In reality, the realbenefits derived from code-share agreements accrue to the
airlines through enhanced product positioning in CRS displays, greater access in
previously restricted markets (especially for foreign carriers), and potentially
greater profits.
Under DOT regulations,
In ordering the [flight] information contained in an integrated display,
[CRSs] shall not use any factors directly or indirectly relating to carrier
identity. [Furthermore s]ystems may order the display of [flight] information
on the basis of any service criteria that do not reflect carrier identity and that
are consistently applied to all carriers .... ."
These restrictions have not prevented CRS airline owners from providing
themselves with significant display preferences for their own services in
connection with code-share arrangements. Code-share flights are commonly
listed twice, which results in superior listings on computer screens in travel
agencies throughout the country.5 In the American/Qantas code-share mentioned
above, two flights would appear in the computer as operating from Chicago to
Sydney, one with American's "AA" flight designator and one with Qantas' "QF."
Even though the "American" flight must be marked with an asterisk, the codeshare flight has gained a competitive advantage over other connecting carriers
which will be moved to an inferior position on the screen or to a subsequent
page, even though they may offer a superior connection than American.
[M]ost airline ticket sales are made by travel agents from the first page of the
computer reservations screen-it is widely acknowledged that more than 70%
of all flights are sold from the first page of the screen. By relegating
competitive service offerings to inferior display [in CRSs] ... these practices

deceive consumers and damage competing airlines . .. "
Although DOT has been the chief proponent of international code-share
agreements it appears to be operating in the dark:
Both Congress's General Accounting Office and Gellman Research Assoc.
studied code sharing in 1994 and concluded that DOT is at a huge
disadvantage in assessing whether the deals enhance or reduce competition;
gain access or boost traffic for U.S. carriers, or simply shift it; make or lose
money and for whom."

53. AmericanAirlines and Qantasto Expand Their CooperativeServices, WORLD AIRLINE

NEws, Nov. 6, 1995, available in DIALOG, IAC-NEWS database.
54. 14 C.F.R. § 255.4(b) (1996).
55. Dempsey, supra note 2, at 63.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Joan M. Feldman, Alliances: Are We Making Money Yet?, AIR TRANSP.
1995, at 25, 26.
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Even given this scarcity of factual information, Democratic Senator Wendell H.
Ford of Kentucky, Senate Aviation Subcommittee Chairman, stated that
Transportation Secretary Frederico Pefia "already ha[s] approved 77 codesharing agreements, 61.6% of such agreements ever presented to DOT for
approval, and that prior to a Virgin-Delta request [which was approved in 1995],
Pefia had not turned down a request for a code-sharing agreement.""8 Every U.S.
carrier has strategically used code-shares not to enhance services, but to
eliminate international services on unprofitable routes. For example, in 1994
Delta Airlines cut four trans-Atlantic routes and removed thirteen Airbus A-3 10
aircraft from its fleet, replacing those services with code-shares with foreign
airlines. 9 And while U.S. carriers have been unwilling or unable to share data
with DOT, many foreign carriers have publicly expressed satisfaction with their
ability to increase access to U.S. markets and profits. As Lufthansa German
Airlines' Senior Vice President-Americas, Frederick Reid, has stated: "We can
measure the benefits precisely, though we're not giving them to DOT. [We've]
made a significant number of tens of millions of dollars. The return on
investment has a better margin than anything I've ever been involved in. ' It is
noteworthy that Lufthansa has been able to achieve this performance entirely
through code-sharing in the absence of any equity investment in U.S. carriers.
B. Changing the Directionof DOT Policy
Code-shares came into being because of the U.S. policy which denies cabotage
rights to foreign airlines. U.S. airline executives claim that "[g]ranting cabotage
rights to foreign air carriers may impair national security, cause U.S. airlines to
lose their competitive advantage in the U.S. market, push some airlines into
bankruptcy, and result in the loss of American jobs to foreigners."'" Yet these
arguments are ill-founded. First, cabotage rights will not weaken national
security since the President or his designee has the authority to revoke or suspend
such rights in the event of a national emergency.62 Secondly, the U.S. airline
industry has already experienced a tremendous fallout, and although all carriers
currently operating are not on solid ground financially; the domestic market is
already highly competitive. Finally, as discussed above, U.S. airlines have
successfully used code-shares to reduce services, and therefore staff. On the
contrary, it is doubtful that the grant of cabotage rights to foreign carriers would
create significant harm to U.S. carriers, since "[flew foreign airlines would
volunteer for a bare-knuckled fight with United and American for control of the

58. Douglas W. Nelms, Delta PresentsIts Case:After $1Billion in Losses, the U.S. Carrier
Is Changing Its European Marketing Strategy with a Major Advertising Campaign, AIR
TRANSP. WORLD, Dec. 1, 1994, at 59, 63.
59. Bridget O'Brian, Delta Air to Drop Four of Its Routes, Remove 13 Fleets, WALL ST.
J., June 15, 1994, at A5.
60. Feldman, supra note 57, at 25, 32.
61. Warner, supranote 5, at 316-17.
62. See 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1994) (providing authority to review certain mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers).
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Chicago hub."63 On the positive side, granting cabotage rights to foreign airlines
will create new job opportunities for Americans to assist in operating and
managing the newly-established domestic services. Americans will also benefit
from increased competition on domestic routes which will insure that prices
remain competitive, and may even cause U.S. carriers to upgrade in-flight
services to the superior level of many foreign carriers. "Cabotage is ...likely to
result in niche marketing, and maybe a little dumping. And if foreign carriers
dump cheap seats on the deregulated U.S. market while enjoying protected
markets at home, the U.S. consumer may benefit.... ,,64
CONCLUSION

The overwhelming use of code-share agreements by DOT in bilateral aviation
agreements constitutes a fraud on consumers. Although "bare-bones" regulations
are in place to inform consumers of code-shares, in practice the traveling public
has a very low level of awareness or understanding concerning them. Moreover,
while DOT has generally been quick to approve any code-share proposal put
forth, it has done so with very little factual knowledge. Today's aviation industry
functions in a global marketplace. Bilateral agreements are antiquated and
significantly inhibit growth in the global marketplace. The United States must be
the leader in international aviation. DOT should abandon its policy of negotiating
code-share agreements and replace it with an aggressive policy of ending the
prohibition on cabotage. Concededly, the United States must endeavor to trade
cabotage rights for rights of similar value. In dealing with small foreign countries
with limited domestic travel, DOT will have to negotiate regional agreements
with several countries. It is time for DOT to consider what is in the interest of
American consumers-both code-shares and cabotage restrictions must gradually
be eliminated. American carriers will adapt and will continue to be at the
forefront of international aviation.

63. Bill Poling, ForeignAidfor U.S. Airline Industry?, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Feb. 28, 1991,
at31, 31.
64. Id.

